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Symposium
HATE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
ON A COLLISION COURSE?
GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO*
I. INTRODUCTIONO N November 20, 1991, the Villanova Law Review and the Phil-
adelphia Bar Association jointly sponsored a Symposium to
commemorate the two-hundredth anniversary of the ratification
of the Bill of Rights. The Symposium was entitled "Hate Speech
and the First Amendment: On a Collision Course?" An illustri-
ous array of panelists was assembled that included Floyd Abrams,
First Amendment litigator and partner at Cahill Gordon &
Reindel; Charles R. Lawrence III, Professor of Law at Stanford
University School of Law and Visiting Professor of Law at Ge-
orgetown University Law Center; Frederick Schauer, Frank Stan-
ton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University; and Nadine Strossen, Profes-
sor of Law at New York Law School and President of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union.
A. The Hate Speech Debate
The current debate over the validity of hate speech' regula-
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; Moderator of the
Hate Speech Symposium that took place at the historic Friends Meetinghouse in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on November 20, 1991. B.A. 1975, University of San
Diego; J.D. 1978, University of Santa Clara School of Law; LL.M. 1979, Ge-
orgetown University Graduate School of Law. Member of the California and
District of Columbia Bars. I would like to thank my research assistants, Gary
Alizzeo and Paul Pollard, for their assistance with the preparation for this Sym-
posium and with the development of this Introduction.
Special thanks are also due to Andr6 L. Dennis, Chancellor of the Philadel-
phia Bar Association, and the members of its Bicentennial Committee, without
whose efforts this Symposium would not have been possible.
1. Although definitions vary, Nadine Strossen has defined "hate speech" as
(723)
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tions grapples with the myriad of interpretations regarding the
scope of the First Amendment. 2 The hate speech debate contin-
ues a historical argument concerning the meaning of the First
Amendment value of free speech and its relationship to other
core constitutional values such as liberty, justice and equality. 3
The central question is under what circumstances the First
Amendment freedom of speech should yield to other values.4
any speech that conveys a message of group-based hatred. Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 488
(1990).
2. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. An important guide to interpreting seemingly ambiguous values in the
Constitution is its Preamble, which reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and es-
tablish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Gilbert Paul Carrasco & Congressman Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., "Unalienable Rights," the Preamble, and the Ninth Amendment: The Spirit of
the Constitution, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 498, 505-506 (1990) (suggesting that Pre-
amble's promise of "the Blessings of Liberty" may be realized through construc-
tion of Ninth Amendment and asserting that this construction encompasses
more than liberty simpliciter referred to in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
4. A fundamental yet essentially resolved conflict is between those com-
mentators who would interpret the First Amendment "absolutely" and those
who believe that there are certain overriding values that justify finding excep-
tions to First Amendment freedom of speech. See, e.g., Hugo Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960). As an advocate of the absolutist approach
to First Amendment interpretation, Justice Black stated:
[T]he decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for a particular
right, such as ... the right of free speech protection of the First
[Amendment], involves a balancing of conflicting interests .... I be-
lieve ... that the Framers themselves did this balancing when they
wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights .... Courts have neither
the right nor the power ... to attempt to make a different evaluation
Id. at 879. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMvrING OF AMERICA: THE POLIT-
ICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). In discussing a general theory of constitu-
tional interpretation, Judge Bork stated:
The difference between our historically grounded constitutional free-
doms and those the theorists, whether of the academy or of the bench,
would replace them with is akin to the difference between the American
and French revolutions. The outcome for liberty was much less happy
under the regime of the abstract "rights of man" than it has been under
the American Constitution. . . . Those who made and endorsed our
Constitution knew man's nature, and it is to their ideas, rather than to
the temptations of utopia, that we must ask that our judges adhere.
Id. at 355.
For discussion of a viewpoint contrary to the textualism ofJustice Black and
724
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The core of the present debate centers on whether hate speech,
and its implications for our society, presents the unavoidable cir-
cumstance in which one very important freedom-equality-must
be protected at the expense of another equally important free-
dom-speech.
The Symposium panelists gathered to present their views on
this legal conundrum and to discuss the growing challenges that
hate speech presents to society and, more specifically, to our legal
system. Every year the morass of constitutional jurisprudence
thickens and becomes increasingly more difficult to decipher and
apply. It is apparent that this legal confusion is hindering the ef-
forts of schools, employers and municipalities to give legal effect
to their intolerance for hatred and inequality. Although lawyers
are being given increasing guidance by the courts, the legal land-
scape is dynamic. This Symposium provided the panelists an op-
portunity to comment on some attempts at hate speech regulation
and to explore the direction that the law might take in light of
some recent important court decisions.
B. Four Distinct Views of Speech Regulation
As demonstrated by the four distinct views presented at the
Symposium, the legal community is currently far from reaching a
consensus on how to address hate speech and hate crimes in
general.
Participating in the Symposium as a preeminent litigator of
constitutional law, Floyd Abrams has long been a defender of
First Amendment freedoms-particularly the freedom of speech.
He vigorously opposes hate speech regulation because, according
to Abrams, such regulation violates the most important precept of
the originalism of Judge Bork, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON (1968). Schwartz
lucidly articulates the tension inherent in any conflict between constitutional val-
ues. Arguing against an interpretivist approach to the First Amendment,
Schwartz stated:
The words of the First Amendment cannot be given the absolute effect
in law which they have in language. Without the freedoms guaranteed
by that Amendment, there would, to be sure, be no free society at all.
But the rejection of one extreme-giving no effect to the Amend-
ment-does not mean that we must embrace the contrary extreme-
giving it unlimited effect. The First Amendment freedoms are not ends
in themselves, but only means to the end of a free society. The First
Amendment freedoms are vital, but their exercise must be compatible
with the preservation of other rights essential in a democracy and guar-
anteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 262.
1992]
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the First Amendment: government may not prohibit expression
simply because it disagrees with the message.
Abrams believes that the Supreme Court has already seri-
ously undermined the First Amendment by treating expression as
a factor to be "weighed on a scale" against relevant state inter-
ests. Abrams asserts that state interests are best served by an un-
compromised freedom of speech and that short-term
compromises in the form of speech regulation will ultimately un-
dermine the long-term goal of equality. In support of his posi-
tion, Abrams notes that hate speech regulations have historically
been used against the very groups they were intended to protect.
Accordingly, he asserts that the ultimate price of restricting
speech, even in the name of equality, is not a price worth paying.
In the end, Abrams believes that the regulation of hate speech
would oblige the regulation of all offensive speech, and as the
"consensus of untouchable content" unravels, little recognizable
free speech theory will remain. 5
Nadine Strossen, a civil libertarian, advocates a strong pre-
sumption against the validity of hate speech regulations. As a
"Guardian for Liberty," she condemns sexism, racism, homo-
phobia and all forms of bias. 6 Thus, for Strossen, protecting the
First Amendment creates a conflict with her ongoing fight for
equality. Strossen uses the Symposium to expand the discussion
of what we traditionally view as hate (i.e. racially motivated)
speech to include gender-based offenses such as sexual
harassment.
Strossen maintains that hate speech in the public forum must
be protected. On the other hand, she asserts that hate speech in
certain other settings should not receive the same level of consti-
tutional protection. Strossen focuses on hate speech that is used
to harass individuals on university campuses and in the workplace
and argues that such speech should be regulated in these settings.
Her major premise is that hate speech should not receive consti-
tutional protection at the expense of equality. Because the need
for equality is particularly compelling in the contexts of education
and employment, Strossen believes that speech in these settings
should be subjected to greater, although narrow, regulation.
5. See generally Floyd Abrams, A Worthy Tradition: The Scholar and the First
Amendment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1162 (1990) (reviewing HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988)).
6. David Gonzalez, A Guardian for Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at A14;
see also A New ACLU Head and an Old Threat: First Woman President Talks About Dan-
gers to Freedom of Speech, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1991, at 71.
726 [Vol. 37: p. 723
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As meaningful equality requires more than merely opening
doors, the courts and Congress have acted to protect employees
from harassment, and universities have enacted codes to protect
students. Strossen believes that both situations require the courts
to scrutinize closely the context of any challenged speech. In the
educational setting, Strossen stresses that the speech in question
must be analyzed with strict scrutiny, and that factors such as the
time, place, pattern of conduct, and relationship of the parties are
critical in determining whether the speech is protected by the
Constitution. In the employment setting, key factors to be con-
sidered include the public or private nature of the forum, the tar-
get of the speech, the size of the audience, and the relationship of
the parties. 7 Strossen cautions, however, that the expansion of
hate speech regulation beyond a limited set of contexts may un-
dermine the central guarantee of free speech without necessarily
advancing equality.
Frederick Schauer utilizes a sociological approach to address
the hate speech debate, expanding on the traditional legal analy-
sis to include a focus on cultural phenomena. Initially, Schauer
questions the salience of the hate speech issue and examines the
link between the identification of the problem and the emergence
of numerous proposals for its regulation. His analysis also in-
cludes a review of the American belief that "sticks and stones may
break my bones but names will never hurt me" and its impact on
hate speech regulation.
Schauer argues that speech is not harmless and that, in fact,
names may hurt you. He hypothesizes that one possible basis for
the widespread emergence of proposals for hate speech regula-
tion is the erroneous presupposition that speech is protected be-
cause it is harmless. A corollary to this presupposition is that the
regulation of harmful speech is therefore justifiable. Herein lies
the confusion present in the hate speech debate because, accord-
ing to Schauer, speech is not protected merely because it is harm-
less; rather, speech is protected despite the harm that it may
cause.
Schauer suggests that the present course of the hate speech
debate may result in a reaffirmation of the belief that speech is
7. As a basis for a discussion on hate speech in the workplace, Strossen
analyzes Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., in which a female shipyard em-
ployee brought suit against her employer, alleging discrimination evidenced by a
hostile work environment caused in part by the display of sexually oriented pho-
tographs. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
19921 727
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protected because it is harmless. Despite this, Schauer recognizes
the impact on society that the debate is having. The process be-
gins with victims of hate speech who, by advocating regulation,
call attention to the reality that such speech is actually harmful. It
is the awareness of this harm that has prompted the many calls for
regulation. Schauer states that the logical reaction to harm in our
Millian world is to seek prohibition of the harmful conduct. In
reality, Schauer believes that most proposed hate speech regula-
tions are underinclusive and fail to fully address the range of po-
tential harms. The hate speech regulations, however, assume a
more symbolically important role by increasing public awareness
of the harmful potential of "free speech."
Charles Lawrence stands as the premier advocate of the con-
stitutionality of hate speech regulations. Lawrence believes that
First Amendment doctrine must be guided by the principle of an-
tisubordination. This principle focuses on the injuries caused by
hate speech and recognizes that hate speech has historically been
used to separate and silence minorities. Lawrence argues that the
desire to achieve equality and to preserve First Amendment
rights, such as freedom of speech for all, mandates the implemen-
tation of hate speech regulations.
Professor Lawrence has demonstrated in a variety of ways
how hate speech is harmful to its victims and inconsistent with
core constitutional values.8 He maintains that hate speech sup-
presses the value of full and equal citizenship and the value of
free expression. According to Lawrence, hate speech perpetuates
systems of caste and subordination, and denies its victims the
ability to exercise legal rights that are protected by the Constitu-
tion and civil rights statutes. Lawrence effectively argues that
8. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990) [hereinafter If He Hollers Let Him
Go]. Professor Lawrence has stated:
The experience of being called "nigger," "spic," "Jap," or "kike" is
like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is instantaneous. There is
neither an opportunity for intermediary reflection on the idea conveyed
nor an opportunity for responsive speech. The harm to be avoided is
both clear and present .... If the purpose of the first amendment is to
foster the greatest amount of speech, then racial insults disserve that
purpose. Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive strike. The
racial invective is experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea, and once
the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue will follow.
Id. at 452; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing need
for "judicial exploration of the cultural meaning of governmental actions with
racially discriminatory impact [as] the best way to discover the unconscious ra-
cism of governmental actors").
728 [Vol. 37: p. 723
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well-established Supreme Court precedent, such as Brown v. Board
of Education,9 already provides the necessary constitutional frame-
work for hate speech regulation.
In contrast to Floyd Abrams, Lawrence differs on the appro-
priateness of balancing individual interests against government
interests. When dealing with hate speech regulation, Lawrence
asserts that courts should recognize the need for equality as the
compelling governmental interest that requires a balancing of in-
terests, rather than utilize a presumption of unconstitutionality.
Lawrence suggests that a refusal to balance these interests-effec-
tively a refusal to regulate hate speech-requires the sub-
ordinated groups, the victims of hate speech, to bear the entire
burden of inequality and unfairly to pay the price for the societal
benefit of free speech.' 0
The Symposium demonstrated that there is a very broad
range of opinions regarding hate speech regulation. Reflecting
the current state of the law, there are many different arguments
that address the implications of hate speech and the need to insti-
tute regulation. Each distinguished speaker gave us a different
perspective, and each chose to address varied components of this
very complicated subject. The remaining sections of this Intro-
duction will provide an overview of the topic of speech regulation
and a framework for consideration of the viewpoints presented by
the Symposium participants. In addition, these sections will in-
troduce additional perspectives to be considered in striking a bal-
ance between free speech and equality.
II. HATE SPEECH REGULATION IN AMERICA-PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE
The outstanding fact about the First Amendment today
is that the Supreme Court has never developed any com-
prehensive theory of what that constitutional guarantee
means and how it should be applied in concrete cases."
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 8, at 472-73. Lawrence
has written previously that "[w]henever we decide that racist hate speech must
be tolerated because of the importance of tolerating unpopular speech we ask
blacks and other subordinated groups to bear a burden for the good of society-
to pay the price for the societal benefit of creating more room for speech." Id. at
472.
11. THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15
(1970).
19921 729
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A. Speech Regulation in America
The United States is a nation that, unfortunately, is still torn
with racism, bigotry and hate, despite a long history of attempts
to eradicate this social tragedy.' 2 Hate crimes are alive and well
in all of society's institutions, including the home, the workplace
and the schools. Legislators, employers and university adminis-
trators are continuing to fight against these destructive forces by,
among other means, attempting to curtail and punish hate
speech. However, to the extent that hate speech is "speech," it is
guaranteed a high degree of protection under the First Amend-
ment. Because good intentions and just social reasons are not the
sole determinants of the constitutionality of speech regulations,
the burden is on the courts to decide which values will be pro-
tected and which will be subordinated.
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction
between constitutionally protected speech and an absolute free-
dom of speech. It is well settled that the First Amendment does
not grant an unlimited license to speak freely.' 3 "Fighting
12. The violent aftermath of the Rodney King trial recently demonstrated
the persistent and ever-increasing tension in society presented by racism and
hate. Newspaper and magazine headlines told the story. See Janice Castro, A
Jarring Verdict, an Angry Spasm; Acquittals in the King-Beating Trial Spark Disbelief
Rage and Rioting, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 10; Marc Lucey & Shawn Hubler, Rioters
Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported Dead, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1992, at A 1; Richard A.
Serrano & Tracy Wilkerson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted, Violence Follows Verdicts;
Guard Called Out, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1992, at Al. See generally GUNNAR MYR-
DAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) (discussing many aspects of African Ameri-
can life in America, including "etiquette of discussion" of race relations).
13. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). The Court in
Konigsberg, through Justice Harlan, stated:
Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least
two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is nar-
rower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms
of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside
the scope of constitutional protection. On the other hand, general reg-
ulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but inci-
dentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the
type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or
the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinat-
ing valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality
which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest
involved.
Id. at 49-51 (citations omitted); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
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words"' 14 and obscene speech' 5 are the primary categories of
speech that the Court has recognized as not worthy of constitu-
tional protection and therefore subject to complete proscription.
In numerous other areas the Court has accorded speech less than
absolute protection. 16 Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court
14. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (establishing
"fighting words" doctrine). The "fighting words" doctrine provides that states
may ban abusive epithets addressed to individuals if they are inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction. Perhaps Chaplinsky is best known for Justice Murphy's
obiter dictum in which he stated:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting words"-those which by their very utterance in-
flict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(distinguishing Chaplinsky on grounds that dialogue in Cohen not directed at par-
ticular individuals and holding that government may not restrict public dialogue
involving unwelcome words, symbols or ideas).
15. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In discussing the consti-
tutional protection that should be afforded obscene material, the Roth Court
stated:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people....
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevail-
ing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, un-
less excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance. ....
Id. at 484; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing guide-
lines for identifying obscenity as unprotected expression).
16. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discuss-
ing elements of defamation necessary for recovery by public officials). The Sulli-
van Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80; see also Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding
First Amendment does not protect defamatory speech from state libel regula-
tions); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (establishing minimum
requirements of fault in actions for defamation of private individuals); cf. Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (establishing group libel standards). In
addition to defamation, other speech that may be abridged includes that which is
19921
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has been reluctant to expand the categories of restrictable speech
beyond the limited categories already defined. Although the
Court has discussed related forms of antagonistic speech, until
recently it had never specifically addressed the constitutional pro-
tection afforded to hate speech.
1. The Constitutionality of Hate Speech Regulations: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul
The Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,1 7
decided in June 1992, provides the most specific analysis of hate
speech regulation to date. In R.A. V., the Court reviewed the con-
stitutionality of a city hate crime ordinance. 18 The defendant in
R.A.V, a juvenile, allegedly violated the ordinance when he
burned a cross in the middle of the night in the backyard of
an African American family's home.' 9 Despite the Minnesota
Supreme Court's interpretation that the ordinance only pro-
scribed "fighting words," the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the ordinance was facially invalid under the First Amend-
ment.20 The Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional
because it only restricted hate speech that fell within certain spec-
ified disfavored topics; such a limitation constituted content-
based discrimination.2'
intended and likely to produce imminent lawless action, commercial speech and,
in some contexts, indecent speech, to namejust a few. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech inducing imminent lawless action); Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial
speech); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (indecent speech).
17. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
18. See id. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, ap-
pellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly con-
duct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 2541 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
19. Id.
20. Id. The trial court held that the ordinance was overbroad and, there-
fore, invalid because it prohibited expressive conduct that is protected by the
First Amendment. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately reversed the
trial court's decision. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991). The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not overbroad because it
only applied to conduct and expression that amounted to "fighting words." Id.
As a result, the United States Supreme Court stated that its review was bound by
the narrow interpretation of the ordinance articulated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
21. RAY., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. The Court stated that although the ordi-
732
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The R.A. V decision dramatically changed the law of speech
regulation and sent a strong signal that the Supreme Court in-
tends to maintain a firm stance against any new form of speech
regulation. The R.A.V. Court articulated a new, unprecedented,
unanticipated and somewhat nonsensical notion of First Amend-
ment underinclusiveness: the decision established that a restric-
tion on "fighting words" will only survive constitutional review if
all "fighting words" are proscribed, and a State cannot target
"fighting words" specifically related to protected classes or
groups. The implementation of effective hate speech regulations
will, apparently, be a slow and limited process, at least for the
near future.
The next case in which the Supreme Court may offer further
guidance on the topic of hate crime regulation is Wisconsin v.
nance banned "fighting words" that related to race, color, creed, religion or
gender, it was unconstitutional to limit coverage to these specific topics. Id. The
Court further stated that "[t]hose who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection
with other ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affili-
ation, union membership, or homosexuality-are not covered." Id. Ultimately,
the Court concluded that the First Amendment did not permit the City of St.
Paul to place "special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on dis-
favored subjects." Id.
In arriving at its holding in R.A. V, the Court was not unanimous in its ra-
tionale. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that selective regula-
tion of speech is not "presumptively invalid"-even if content-based-and may
be constitutionally permissible if "the legislature's selection is based on a legiti-
mate, neutral, and reasonable distinction." Id. at 2564-66 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens challenged the majority's assertion that the ordinance
improperly regulated expression based on viewpoint. Id. at 2571 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He chose to view the ordinance as one that regulated on the basis
of the harm caused by the specified expression. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens stated:
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, the St. Paul ordinance
does not regulate expression based on viewpoint. ...
The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advo-
cates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not
prevent either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis
of their conflicting ideas, but it does bar both sides from hurling such
words on the basis of the target's "race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der."...
In sum, the St. Paul ordinance (as construed by the Court) regu-
lates expressive activity that is wholly proscribable and does so not on
the basis of viewpoint, but rather in recognition of the different harms
caused by such activity. Taken together, these several considerations
persuade me that the St. Paul ordinance is not an unconstitutional con-
tent-based regulation of speech ....
Id. at 2570-71 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Mitchell.22 In Mitchell, an African American juvenile received an
enhanced sentence under Wisconsin's hate crime penalty enhanc-
ing statute for participating in the aggravated battery of a white
juvenile shortly after seeing the film "Mississippi Burning."2 3 A
jury found Mitchell guilty of violating the hate crime statute be-
cause he had intentionally selected the victim based on the vic-
tim's race.24 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the statute was unconstitutional because
it enhanced punishment for certain crimes based on the perpetra-
tor's reason for selecting the victim, thus punishing constitution-
ally protected thought.25 The Wisconsin Supreme Court further
held that because the statute requires the use of the offender's
speech to prove motive, the statute unconstitutionally threatens
to chill free speech. 26
The logic used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Mitch-
ell case poses a threat to the entire body of civil rights law under
the guise of freedom of expression. Speech and intent are not
addressed by the Wisconsin hate crime statute in a vacuum, but
are only proscribed when connected to overt, harmful conduct.2 7
Indeed, the approach of this statute is similar to the way in which
all proscriptions against intentional discrimination are effected.
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, race, or ethnicity based conduct is only proscribable be-
cause of its discriminatory animus.2 8  To undermine this
fundamental principle is to pull the rug out from under the entire
edifice of civil rights jurisprudence.
2. Regulating Hate Speech at Universities
Hate speech continues to be a serious problem at our col-
leges and universities. Incidents of hate speech and other hate-
motivated expressions are actually increasing on American col-
22. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 810 (1992).
23. Id. at 809.
24. Id. at 808-09.
25. Id. at 815-17.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 809 n.l.
28. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discussing need to show that discriminatory purpose is
motivating factor behind government action before violation of Fourteenth
Amendment can be established); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (re-
viewing disproportionate impact of police entrance exam; discussing necessity of
purposeful discrimination to find violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
[Vol. 37: p. 723
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lege campuses. In recent years, more than 250 universities have
experienced incidents of bigotry characterized by racism, sexism
and homophobia. 29 Nearly one million students have been vic-
timized by the physical and emotional pains of hate-based
actions.30
In response to this problem, approximately 200 universities
have enacted codes prohibiting offensive speech and/or conduct
that demean persons on the basis of race, gender, religion, ances-
try or sexual orientation.3t Many university administrators be-
lieve that these regulations are necessary to ensure that all
students are afforded equal access to education.3 2 These univer-
sity codes, however, are under fire as being violative of students'
First Amendment rights, and thus far the universities seem to be
losing the battle.33
29. See Ronald J. Riccio, Schools' Daze: Free Speech v. Freedom from Fear, 129
N.J. L.J., Oct. 10, 1991, at 15. According to Riccio, "[o]ne need look no further
than our nation's university campuses, that home away from home for our sup-
posedly brightest and most talented future leaders, to recognize the sad reality
that bigotry is flourishing in the United States." Id.; see also U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN COLLEGE CAMPUSES 3-11
(1990) (discussing extent and causes of bigotry on American university
campuses).
30. Riccio, supra note 29, at 15. Of these one million victims of bigotry, at
least twenty-five percent have been harassed on multiple occasions. Id.
31. See CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, CAMPUS
LIFE: IN SEARCH OF COMMUNITY 19, 137-38 (1990) (discussing results of survey
that indicated 60% of colleges and universities surveyed had written policies on
bigotry, racial harassment or intimidation and another 11% were developing
similar policies); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 13-15 (discuss-
ing actions taken by Pennsylvania State University in attempt to eliminate big-
otry on campus).
32. See Patricia B. Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory Harassment by Regulating
Student Speech: A Balancing of First Amendment and University Interests, 16J.C. & U.L.
573, 579 (1990). Universities have a legitimate interest in ensuring equal access
to education for all students. Id. Hodulik asserts that "[h]arassment impedes
the educational process, and interferes with the educational pursuits of its vic-
tims. It damages individuals, impairing their ability to function in the academic
environment." Id.
33. See CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note
31, at 19-23 (noting practical difficulties in regulating speech). Public and state
university regulatory codes necessarily have First Amendment implications be-
cause such attempts constitute "state action." See, e.g., Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (noting that public universi-
ties such as Michigan are state-chartered and therefore involve state action as
compared to private institutions such as Yale that are not subject to First
Amendment limitations); Hodulik, supra note 32, at 576 (noting need of Wiscon-
sin, a state institution, to balance duty to provide equal access to education with
students' First Amendment rights). The problem presented by many of these
regulations, which is noted by reviewing courts, is that the regulations create
content-based restrictions on speech. Restrictions are deemed to be content-
based if they are based on communicative impact and single out ideas or infor-
1992] 735
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The University of Michigan3 4 and the University of Wiscon-
sin 35 (both public institutions) recently found themselves in
United States district courts defending their regulatory codes.
Both codes were found unconstitutional, by two different courts,
on two grounds: (1) the codes were overly vague, and (2) they
violated the overbreadth doctrine.3 6 These decisions indicate
mation "(a) because of the specific message or viewpoint such actions express,
or (b) because of the effects produced by awareness of the information or ideas
such actions impart." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988).
34. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852. The University of Michigan
instituted its campus-wide antidiscrimination code, entitled The University of
Michigan Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment, as a response to in-
creasing occurrences of racist incidents on its campus. Id. at 856. Under the
University of Michigan's code, students were subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap, or
Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's aca-
demic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering
with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in
University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety;
or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment
for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical
conduct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex
or sexual orientation where such behavior:
[statute repeats subparagraphs a., b. & c. of § 1. cited above]
Id. The policy's prohibitions were limited strictly to academic and educational
areas including classroom buildings, libraries and laboratories. Id.
35. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis.
1991). Similar to the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin
adopted its code to help control racist and discriminatory expression. Id. at
1164-65. Under Wisconsin's code, students could be disciplined:
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expres-
sive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at dif-
ferent individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets
or other expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or in-
dividuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for
education, university-related work, or other university authorized
activity.
(b) Whether the intent required under par. (a) is present shall be de-
termined by consideration of all relevant circumstances.
Id. at 1164 (citing Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2)(a)-(b)).
36. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1177, 1180-81 (holding that Wisconsin's
policy prohibited protected speech and as applied forced students to guess re-
736
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that the courts are unwilling to create a constitutional exception
for campus hate speech regulations, regardless of whether such
speech undermines the academic mission. In addition, these de-
cisions also suggest that all future university codes will need to
track closely the limited categories of unprotected speech-as de-
fined by the Supreme Court-or risk being overturned.
B. Some Additional Grist For the Mill
Although neither this Symposium nor the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in R.A. V,7 which was rendered some seven
months later, resolved the debate over hate speech, both events
advanced the jurisprudential development of the controversy. In
considering the richness of the views of the Symposium partici-
pants, there are two perspectives that might be useful in striking a
balance between speech and equality. First, there is the interna-
tional norm which is quite different from the traditional American
notion of free speech. Second, if the American tradition is the
preferred point of departure, an analysis of hate speech regula-
tion should include a candid recognition that an absolute view of
the First Amendment has long since been abandoned. In prac-
tice, the Court has abandoned absolutism in favor of establishing
a hierarchy of values that subordinates freedom of speech to
many other social values.
1. International Norms
The international community clearly views hate speech as
volatile, injurious and subject to proscription.38 The most defini-
tive evidence of this is found in two widely adopted international
instruments: (1) the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and (2) the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 9 The Convention on Ra-
garding conduct that might be proscribed); University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at
864-67 (holding that Michigan's rule was overbroad because it covered speech
that did not have tendency to incite violence; rule was vague because unclear
whether restricted speech actually had to demean listener or whether speaker
need only intend to demean listener for speech to come within rule).
37. For a discussion of R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, see supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text.
38. See Norman Redlich, Racist Speech, The American Constitution, and the Com-
munity of Nations: Can the Conflicting Values Be Reconciled?, TEL Aviv L. REV. (forth-
coming 1993) (manuscript copy at 4-5; copy on file with Villanova Law Review)
(discussing international condemnation of hate speech as evidenced by interna-
tional covenants and conventions).
39. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1966, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 212, 218, 220
1992] 737
15
Carrasco: Hate Speech and the First Amendment: On a Collision Course
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
cial Discrimination mandates punishment for "all dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [or] incitement to
racial discrimination," and does "not permit public authorities or
public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial
discrimination. -40 Similarly, the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights proscribes "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or
violence." 41
Given the consistent level of interracial tension that has
plagued our country, one would have difficulty reaching the
seemingly optimistic conclusion, as some have, that "the Ameri-
can protection for 'hate speech' is probably a luxury that Ameri-
can society can afford in light of the overwhelming national
consensus condemning such speech, and the adoption of a broad
body of law that condemns acts of discrimination." 42 In fact,
Canada-the country perhaps most similar to the United States-
was not able to reach such a conclusion. In upholding the consti-
tutionality of anti-hate propaganda laws, the Supreme Court of
Canada stated that such laws "are one part of a free and demo-
cratic society's bid to prevent the spread of racism, and their ra-
tional connection to this objective must be seen in such a
context." 43 The court also stated:
Hatred is predicated on destruction, and hatred against
identifiable groups therefore thrives on insensitivity, big-
otry and destruction of both the target group and of the
values of our society. Hatred in this sense is a most ex-
treme emotion that belies reason; an emotion that, if ex-
ercised against members of an identifiable group,
implies that those individuals are to be despised,
scorned, denied respect and made subject to ill-treat-
[hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination] (128 countries were parties
to this Convention as of December 1989); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178
[hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] (87 countries were parties to
this convention as of December 1990). See generally Redlich, supra note 38, manu-
script at 4-5.
40. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 39, art. 4, paras. (a),
(c), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
41. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 39, art. 20, para. 2,
999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
42. Redlich, supra note 38, manuscript at 10. Professor Redlich suggests
that Americans should be aware that international intolerance of hate speech is
based on a different value system. Id. manuscript at 10-11.
43. R. v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697, 770 (1990) (Can.).
738 [Vol. 37: p. 723
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ment on the basis of group affiliation. 44
Incitement to racial violence is outlawed in most liberal de-
mocracies, including Great Britain and most of Western Europe.
Moreover, it would appear that interracial and interethnic rela-
tions are persistently strained in the United States when com-
pared to most other nations in the world, and particularly when
compared to those nations with the most similar social and juridi-
cal norms. If the American jurisprudential model continues to in-
corporate hierarchical analysis in the interpretation of the First
Amendment, it appears that the international trend should, at a
minimum, inform the normative calculus.
2. The American Tradition
Those who believe that the American legal tradition is the
sole basis for First Amendment analysis must recognize that
American legal precedent subordinates free speech to many other
values. Read literally, the First Amendment appears to absolutely
prohibit the government from taking any action that would im-
pede an individual's freedom to speak.45 Were this the current
state of the law, I would agree that regulation of hate speech is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, has not inter-
preted the First Amendment as granting an absolute license to
speak freely in all situations. 46 Rather, the Court has carved out
several categories of speech that are not constitutionally pro-
tected against government proscription and has recognized addi-
tional categories that receive a reduced level of protection. 47 The
Court has held that defamation, obscenity, and "fighting words"
are not entitled to the same level of protection granted other
types of speech.48 Given that the Court has provided for these
exceptions, one must conclude that there are other social values
that are held in higher esteem than the freedom of speech.
Therefore, the constitutional review of hate speech regulations
should identify those values that underlie these current First
44. Id. at 777.
45. For the text of the First Amendment, see supra note 2.
46. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) ("[lIt is appar-
ent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to
protect every utterance."). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the First Amendment, see supra note 16.
47. For a discussion of those categories of speech receiving reduced levels
of constitutional protection, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of these categories of speech, see supra notes 14-16 and
accompanying text.
19921 739
17
Carrasco: Hate Speech and the First Amendment: On a Collision Course
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Amendment exceptions and compare them to the values underly-
ing any proposed exceptions.
I propose, and some of the Symposium commentators agree,
that some of the values underlying the prohibition of hate speech
are already values that the Supreme Court has held to be at least
as important as the freedom of speech.49 Freedom from physical
harm is one such value. The persons at whom hate speech is di-
rected suffer both psychological and physical harm. 50 In creating
the "fighting words" exception to the First Amendment, the
Court prioritized the need to protect certain groups of people by
placing narrow restrictions on the rights of others to be abusive
and to express themselves in a manner that is likely to lead to
physical harm.5' Protection from emotional and psychological in-
jury, which often manifests itself physically, is consistent with the
value underlying the fighting words doctrine and should be ac-
corded appropriate constitutional recognition. Moreover, in rec-
ognizing the important value of equal protection in proscribing
race, or ethnicity-based fighting words or other proscribable con-
duct, it is not necessary to dispense with the jurisprudence of
overbreadth and vagueness. Freedom of expression is also a pre-
cious right, and narrowly tailored legislation is essential. Finally,
it has been observed that hate speech is used to suppress the will-
ingness of its victims to exercise their own right to freedom of
49. See Symposium, Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and
American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 337 (1989). Mari Mat-
suda has come even further, observing that
if I were to give primacy to any one right, and if I were to create a
hierarchy, I would put equality first, because the right of speech is
meaningless to people who do not have equality.
The values at the heart of the first amendment are the values of
personhood-that each human being is special and deserves a place in
this society in their beliefs and their personal consciousness. From that
value I derive my position that we need to limit hate speech.
Id. at 360.
50. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137-39 (1982) (noting
that racial stigmatization may cause "humiliation, isolation and self-hatred" as
well as physical harm such as high blood pressure); see also Mari J. Matsuda, Pub-
lic Response To Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2336 (1989) ("Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physiologi-
cal symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse
rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hy-
pertension, psychosis and suicide." (footnote omitted)).
51. For a discussion of the "fighting words" exception to the First Amend-
ment, see supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also TRIBE, supra note 33,
§ 12-10, at 849-53 (describing development of "fighting words" doctrine in
Chaplinsky and later cases).
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speech.5 2 Consequently, hate speech regulation should not be
viewed as an exception, but instead a buttress to the freedom of
speech.
It remains to be seen just how far the Court is prepared to go
in striking down regulation of "speech" that seeks to curb or pun-
ish that which cannot be justified by any theory of ideas. This
Symposium has not definitively answered that question, but it has
certainly provided thoughtful insight toward a reconciliation of
what all seem to agree are extremely precious competing social
values.
52. See Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 8, at 468 (observing
that racism "coercively silence[s] members of those groups who are its targets").
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